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ABSTRACT
In 1947, civil rights pioneers James Peck and Bayard Rustin,
members of the radical religious group, the Fellowship of Reconciliation,
and its offshoot, the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), prepared to
embark on the Journey of Reconciliation, an interracial protest against
segregated busing in the American South. But first, they did something
else radical: they bought shares in a corporation. A year later, after their
travels in the South had led to terror, death threats, beatings, and in
Rustin’s case, a term on a chain gang, they brought their civil rights
activism to a new site of protest—the shareholder meeting of that
corporation, Greyhound Bus Lines. Invoking the shareholder proposal rule
adopted a few years before by the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC), Peck and Rustin insisted that as shareholders they had a right to
voice their opinions about Greyhound’s segregation policies and to poll
other shareholders on the issue. When Greyhound refused to send their
proposal to other shareholders in its proxy statement, they brought the case
that became known as Peck v. Greyhound. In 1952, to end the case and
future litigation, the SEC changed its rules and held that shareholders
could not use the shareholder proposal mechanism “primarily for the
purpose of promoting . . . racial, religious, or social or similar causes.” In
this landmark case, we see the collision of race and the corporate and
securities laws, as radicals attempted to use those laws to pursue social
justice, while those charged with administering them insisted that race had
no role to play in the corporation—in the process paradoxically writing
race into the nation’s securities laws.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1947, James Peck and Bayard Rustin, members of the radical
pacifist group, the Fellowship of Reconciliation (FOR or Fellowship), and
its offshoot, the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), were preparing for
a protest they called the Journey of Reconciliation, now remembered as
the first Freedom Ride.1 Inspired by Quaker pacifism, Gandhian
nonviolence, and their own experiences as conscientious objectors during
World War II, Peck, who was white, Rustin, who was African American,
and other members of the Fellowship would ride as an interracial group in
buses across the upper South, attempting to force bus lines to live up to the
Supreme Court’s 1946 decision in Morgan v. Virginia, holding
segregation in interstate travel unconstitutional.2 In the short run, this first
Freedom Ride would meet little success, as the members of the Fellowship
faced threats, beatings, and in Rustin’s case a thirty-day sentence to a chain
1. JAMES PECK, FREEDOM RIDE 14 (1962) [hereinafter PECK, FREEDOM RIDE]. The 1947 protest
was not called a “Freedom Ride,” a term coined for a similar 1961 protest, but Peck and others later
referred to the 1947 protest as a Freedom Ride and so the term is used here. See generally JAMES
PECK, UNDERDOGS VS. UPPERDOGS 123 (1980) [hereinafter PECK, UNDERDOGS VS. UPPERDOGS].
The standard historical account on the Journey of Reconciliation is DEREK CHARLES CATSAM,
FREEDOM’S MAIN LINE: THE JOURNEY OF RECONCILIATION AND THE FREEDOM RIDES 13–42 (2011);
GEORGE HOUSER & BAYARD RUSTIN, WE CHALLENGED JIM CROW!: A REPORT ON THE JOURNEY OF
RECONCILIATION (1947).
2. Morgan v. Virgina, 328 U.S. 373 (1946). For background on the case, see MICHAEL J.
KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS 264–66 (2004).
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gang for their efforts.3 In the long run, however, it would pave the way for
the civil rights movement of the 1950s, the renewed Freedom Rides in
1961, and the eventual upending of state-mandated racial segregation.
Before they began their ride through the South in 1947, however,
Peck and Rustin took an unexpected step that would have radical
consequences of its own: they bought shares in a corporation.4 A year later,
after the Journey had ended, they went to the annual meeting of that
corporation, Greyhound Bus Company, which even after Morgan v.
Virginia continued as a matter of company policy to segregate its interstate
buses in the South.5 There they invoked a different body of federal law,
the federal securities laws, to insist that Greyhound provide all its
shareholders the opportunity to vote on a proposal condemning the
company’s continued operation of segregated bus routes. The law they
invoked at the shareholder meeting was less than a decade old: in 1942,
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) had used its powers under
§ 14 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to adopt a new rule, Rule
X14a-7 (now 14a-8), the “Shareholder Proposal Rule,” giving a
shareholder under some circumstances the power to make such proposals
and requiring companies to send the proposals to all their shareholders in
their annual proxy solicitations—at the company’s expense.6 When
Greyhound refused, Peck, with financial backing from CORE, sued
Greyhound to have their proposal included in Greyhound’s proxy
materials.7 To end the suit and cut off future ones, in 1952, the SEC
amended the rule. Before then, the rule had allowed companies to exclude
proposals “of a general political, social, or economic nature.”8 The 1952
amendment, however, specifically targeted the Greyhound proposal, and
added new language to forbid proposals “primarily for the purpose of
3. CATSAM, supra note 1, at 40–42.
4. James Peck, Minority Stockholders v. Jim Crow, CRISIS MAG., June–July 1951, at 375, 375;
Letter from George M. Houser to Martin A. Martin (Feb. 3, 1950), Papers of the Congress of Racial
Equality, Series 3, Reel 13 [hereinafter CORE Papers] (“At the time of the Journey of Reconciliation
Jim Peck and Bayard Rustin each got a share of the Greyhound stock in order to fight the jimcrow
seating issue in the stockholders meeting.”).
5. See MIA BAY, TRAVELING BLACK: A STORY OF RACE AND RESISTANCE 250–52 (2021);
KLARMAN, supra note 2, at 264–65.
6. This Article was written in the year of COVID-19, when the National Archives, which hold
the records of the SEC, were not open. My accounts of the internal workings of that agency have thus
relied on SEC releases and a number of secondary sources, the most important of which was: Philip
A. Nicholas Jr., The Securities and Exchange Commission and the Shareholder Proposal Rule: Agency
Administration, Corporate Influence, and Shareholder Power, 1942–1988, at 103–54 and passim
(2002) (Ph.D. dissertation, University at Albany, State University of New York). I was alerted to the
existence of this source by: Dalia Tsuk Mitchell, Shareholders as Proxies, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1503, 1546 n.221 (2006).
7. Peck v. Greyhound Corp., 97 F. Supp. 679, 680 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
8. Exchange Act Release No. 34-3638, 1945 WL 27415 (Jan. 3, 1945).
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promoting . . . general economic, political, racial, religious, or social or
similar causes.”9 In an attempt to insist that racial causes were illegitimate
subjects for shareholders’ concern, race had been written into the securities
laws.
This is the first full-scale examination of Peck v. Greyhound. While
earlier scholars have touched briefly on the case, they have spent little time
on it, perhaps because it falls between two scholarly fields that until very
recently have rarely overlapped: corporate and securities laws and the
legal history of race and civil rights.10 Corporate and securities law
scholars have occasionally discussed Peck v. Greyhound as an episode in
the evolution of the shareholder proposal rule—still an important topic11—
but few have spotted the connection between the case and the change to
the rule in 1952, or the way the change stymied shareholder civil rights
activism in much of the 1950s and 1960s. Historians of the 1961 Freedom
Rides and CORE have sometimes mentioned the case in passing but
understandably have focused their attention on the large-scale social
movements and legal campaigns that ultimately toppled legal segregation
rather than on an unsuccessful securities law case.12
That is regrettable, because the case illustrates the sometime
surprising interplay of race and American corporate and securities laws.
Drawing on the records and statements of two organizations rarely
9. Exchange Act Release No. 34-4668 (Jan. 31, 1952) (emphasis added).
10. There a few notable exceptions discussing Peck v. Greyhound. See Lisa Fairfax, Social
Activism through Shareholder Activism, 76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1129–35 (2019) (discussing Peck v.
Greyhound); Sarah Haan, Civil Rights and Shareholder Activism: SEC v. Medical Committee for
Human Rights, 76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1167, 1214–15 (2019); and Mitchell, Shareholders as
Proxies, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. at 1554–56. The only work I am aware of that notes Rustin’s
involvement with this case, and the work from which I first learned of it, is Richard Marens, Inventing
Corporate Governance: The Emergence of Shareholder Activism in the Nineteen-Forties, 8 J. BUS. &
MGMT. 365, 371–72 (2002).
11. The literature on shareholder proposals is immense, as the shareholder proposal has not only
been a vehicle for social protest but also for attempts to improve corporate governance, and it is still
hotly fought over. For discussion of recent developments, see, for example, Jennifer Hill, The
Trajectory of American Corporate Governance: Shareholder Empowerment and Private Ordering
Conflict, 2019 ILL. L. REV. 509, 525–27 (discussing use of shareholder proposals related to corporate
governance); for data on the most recent year’s shareholder proposals, see Gibson Dunn, Shareholder
Proposal Developments During the 2020 Proxy Season (August 4, 2020),
https://www.gibsondunn.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/shareholder-proposal-developmentsduring-the-2020-proxy-season.pdf [https://perma.cc/U7HH-AQDV]; on recent changes to the rule,
see Procedural Requirements and Resubmission Thresholds Under Exchange Act Rule 14a-8,
Exchange Act Release No. 34-89964, (Sept. 23, 2020); see also, e.g., Lillian Brown, Meredith B.
Cross & Alan J. Wilson, SEC Adopts Long-Awaited Amendments to Modernize Shareholder Proposal
Rule, WILMERHALE (Sept. 24, 2020), https://www.wilmerhale.com/en/insights/clientalerts/20200924-sec-adopts-long-awaited-amendments-to-modernize-shareholder-proposal-rule
[https://perma.cc/Z2GQ-6H34].
12. See, e.g., CATSAM, supra note 1, at 57–58; see also AUGUST MEIER & ELLIOT RUDWICK,
CORE: A STUDY IN THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 1942–1968, at 46 (1973).
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discussed together, CORE and the SEC, this Article shows how race and
the securities laws collided in Peck v. Greyhound. It demonstrates that the
case was not, as some earlier writers have assumed, Peck’s alone, but
equally the work of the legendary African American civil rights leader
Bayard Rustin. Their joint action was in turn a product of, and shaped by,
the ethos of the Fellowship of Reconciliation, one of the nation’s most
notable and long-lived Christian pacifist organizations. The ensuing
litigation was guided and funded by CORE, a pathbreaking civil rights
organization. And eventually the case and subsequent rule change would
have an impact both on the civil rights movement, as it largely precluded
the shareholder proposal as a vehicle for protest during the 1950s and
1960s, and in securities laws, as it helped minimize the movement to give
shareholders a voice in corporate governance—to promote “shareholder
democracy”—in mid-century America.13
Finally, this Article contributes to a nascent movement to integrate
race into the study of corporate and securities laws, areas that until recently
have rarely been linked. While corporations, like almost all other
American institutions, have been deeply intertwined with the United
States’ racial structure and attempts to change it,14 the idea that corporate
and securities laws in particular can raise racial issues has been largely
absent from scholarly literature.15 In the last few years, however, a number
of articles, often focused on shareholder activism, have begun to challenge
that premise, and show that the divide presumed naturally to separate the
two fields has in fact been constructed by lawyers and scholars, sometimes
in the face of opponents who insisted the two areas were not separate at
all.16 Here, I join those other authors in insisting on the link between race
13 See generally FRANK D. EMERSON & FRANKLIN LATCHAM, SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY: A
BROADER OUTLOOK FOR CORPORATIONS (1954); see also Harwell Wells, “Corporation Law is
Dead”: Heroic Managerialism, Legal Change, and the Puzzle of Corporation Law at the Height of
the American Century, 15 U. PA. BUS. L.J. 305, 339–44 (2013).
14. This seems so obvious as to not need support. That said, see generally Nancy Leong, Racial
Capitalism, 126 HARV. L. REV. 2151 (2013); JULIET E. K WALKER, HISTORY OF BLACK BUSINESS
IN AMERICA (1998); MEHRSA BARADARAN, THE COLOR OF MONEY: BLACK BANKS AND THE RACIAL
WEALTH GAP (2019); SLAVERY’S CAPITALISM: A NEW HISTORY OF AMERICAN ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT (Sven Beckert & Seth Rockman eds., 2018); EDWARD E. BAPTISTE, THE HALF THAT
HAS NEVER BEEN TOLD: SLAVERY AND THE MAKING OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM (2016).
15. There have been attempts to call scholars’ attention to connection between the two areas, but
they have for the most part not attracted the attention they deserve. For examples from previous
decades see, for example, Aron Dhir, Towards a Race and Gender-Conscious Conception of the Firm:
Canadian Corporate Governance, Law and Diversity, 35 QUEEN’S L.J. 569 (2010); Thomas Joo,
Race, Corporate Law, and Shareholder Value, 54 J. LEGAL EDUC. 351 (2004); Cheryl Wade,
Attempting To Discuss Race in Business and Corporate Law Courses and Seminars, 77 ST. JOHN’S L.
REV. 901 (2003); and especially Richard R. W. Brooks, Incorporating Race, 106 COLUM. L. REV.
2023 (2006).
16. Recent works include Fairfax, supra note 10; Haan, supra note 10; Veronica Root Martinez,
A More Equitable Corporate Purpose, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CORPORATE PURPOSE AND
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and corporation law by documenting how, seventy years ago, a few
radicals attempted to use the nation’s corporate and securities laws to insist
that a corporation face up to its role in the nation’s system of racial
subordination, and how the guardians of those laws defeated them.
This Article was prepared for the symposium on “Corporate
Capitalism and the City of God,” held at the Seattle University School of
Law’s Adolf A. Berle, Jr. Center on Corporations, Law and Society, and
it belongs in the symposium for at least two reasons. First, Peck and Rustin
acted as members of FOR when they embarked on the Journey of
Reconciliation, and their campaign against Greyhound was a product of
that group’s radical religious commitment (and of Rustin’s, at least,
Quaker faith).17 Yet, there is a second reason it belongs in a symposium
named after Adolf Berle, a man best remembered as a student of the
American corporation and author of the 1932 classic, The Modern
Corporation and Private Property.18 The title “Corporate Capitalism and
the City of God” was borrowed from a chapter of Berle’s 1954 book, The
20th Century Capitalist Revolution, where he argued that the United States
had entered an era where corporations would have to “consciously take
account of philosophical considerations,” and ask how their operations
would forward the “good life.”19 The corporation had become, Berle
argued, the “conscience-carrier of twentieth century American society.”20
In Peck v. Greyhound we have a moment where shareholders demanded
that a corporation act with a conscience, and the corporation, followed by
the federal government, refused.
Part I of the Article introduces Peck, Rustin, the FOR, and the
Journey of Reconciliation. Part II shifts focus to look at shareholders and
their role in the corporation at the middle of the twentieth century and the
shareholder proposal rule. Lastly, Part III discusses Peck v. Greyhound
and its aftermath.

PERSONHOOD (Elizabeth Pollman & Robert Thompson eds., 2021); Evelyn Atkinson, Frankenstein’s
Baby: The Forgotten History of Corporations, Race, and Equal Protection (unpublished paper on file
with author); Sarah Barringer Gordon, The African Supplement: Religion, Race, and Corporate Law
in Early National America, 72 WM. & MARY Q. 385 (2015).
17. Ironically, even though he worked for a religious organization, Peck was an atheist. See
JOSEPH KIP KOSEK, ACTS OF CONSCIENCE: CHRISTIAN NONVIOLENCE AND MODERN AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY 204 (2009).
18. ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY (1932).
19. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION 166–67 (1954).
20. Id. at 182. For an interesting reflection on this, see Nelson & Sepper in this volume. Elizabeth
Sepper & James D. Nelson, Adolf Berle’s Corporate Conscience, 45 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 97 (2021).
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I. CIVIL RIGHTS, RELIGIOUS ACTIVISM, AND THE JOURNEY OF
RECONCILIATION
A. FOR, CORE, Rustin, and Peck
Peck v. Greyhound had its roots in the Fellowship of Reconciliation.
The Fellowship was formed in 1915 as the U.S. branch of an international
network of pacifist organizations opposed to World War I.21 It was the “the
original American proponent of modern Christian nonviolence.”22 After
the war, the FOR continued its antiwar efforts, but in the 1920s and 1930s
members also became involved in other then-radical causes, including
anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist organization and opposition to
American racism.23 Most notably, FOR members in the 1930s were the
first to import the nonviolent ideals of Mohandas Gandhi into the United
States.24 While there had long been pacifists in America, “religious
pacifists—and before the twentieth century virtually all pacifism was
religious—tended to view their condemnation of violence as a matter of
personal conviction. Its effect upon others, though sometimes profound,
was ultimately irrelevant to the believer’s own determination to follow
God’s will.”25 The direct nonviolent action pioneered by Gandhi and
championed by the FOR promised something other than this quietism.26 It
aimed to produce social change, both through mass refusal to cooperate
with injustice and by publicly dramatizing unjust conditions.27 As the
FOR’s president, the Quaker A. J. Muste, saw it, Gandhian nonviolence
would be a vehicle to “revolutionize America.”28
Yet precisely how it would change America, and the world, posed a
dilemma for FOR by the beginning of the 1940s. The Fellowship was born
in opposition to the first World War, and its core commitment was always
against war and militarism. As the second World War loomed, FOR was
consumed with opposing the conflict by assisting men who refused
conscription. Action against American racism took a back seat. In
response, in early 1942 several FOR members based in Chicago, led by
the African American James Farmer and the white George Houser,
21. See KOSEK supra note 17, at 4.
22. Id.
23. See Clyde W. Barrow, Abraham Johannes Muste, AM. NAT’L BIOGRAPHY (1999). See
generally JOHN D’EMILIO, LOST PROPHET: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF BAYARD RUSTIN 40–44 (2003).
24. See KOSEK, supra note 17, at 87–99.
25. Id. at 97.
26 SCOTT H. BENNETT, RADICAL PACIFISM: THE WAR RESISTERS LEAGUE AND GANDHIAN
NONVIOLENCE IN AMERICA, 1915–1963, at xv (2003).
27. See id. at 85–111.
28 JAMES FARMER, LAY BARE THE HEART: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS
MOVEMENT 85 (1998).
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decided the best way to handle FOR’s conflicting commitments was to
form a new organization devoted to applying “Gandhi’s methods against
racial inequality.”29 They called it the Congress of Racial Equality
(CORE).30 In founding CORE they did not leave FOR, but CORE offered
them a separate vehicle for combating racism.
CORE joined many other groups already devoted to civil rights, most
notably the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
(NAACP). Yet, CORE saw itself as more radical than existing civil rights
organizations, and as unique in its deployment of “a sophisticated form of
Christian nonviolence . . . on behalf of racial equality.”31 Not for CORE
was the slow, plodding (though tremendously important) work of carefully
filing strategic lawsuits. Instead, CORE saw progress lying in nonviolent
protests designed to generate opposition and so very publicly enact “the
performance of justice,” a strategy that would ultimately find its great
success in the Montgomery Bus Boycott of 1956–57 and other nonviolent
demonstrations against segregation, including the 1961 Freedom Rides.
Early CORE actions, such as interracial “sit-downs” at Chicago
restaurants that refused to serve African Americans, demonstrated this
approach by not merely protesting racism but drawing attention to it. As
the historian Joseph Kip Kosek described it, “[CORE] innovators
dramatized existential moral action against racism by rehearsing, staging,
casting, and replaying it as both ritual and spectacle.”32
Following the end of the war, FOR and CORE were again able to
turn to challenging the segregation that, even after a war fought for
democracy, appeared firmly rooted in the United States. While FOR and
CORE were formally distinct, during the 1940s they overlapped in ways
that made it difficult to separate the two. CORE’s unsalaried leaders often
held paid positions at the FOR; for instance George Houser, CORE’s
executive secretary, and Bayard Rustin, the prominent CORE organizer,
were at the same time co-heads of FOR’s “Racial and Industrial
Department.”33 Additionally, “CORE’s national projects were jointly
sponsored by FOR, with the Fellowship providing a major part of the
financing.”34 In late 1946, the two organizations began planning a new
push to challenge segregation and targeted segregated bus transport in the
American South. This would become the Journey of Reconciliation
(Journey), later remembered as the first Freedom Ride.
29. Id. at 53.
30. Congress “of” rather than “for,” as the founders believed the races were already equal. MEIER
& RUDWICK, supra note 12, at 8.
31. KOSEK, supra note 17, at 204.
32. Id.
33. MEIER & RUDWICK, supra note 12, at 19; see also D’EMILIO, supra note 23, at 60.
34. MEIER & RUDWICK, supra note 12, at 20.
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It is here that we encounter the two men who would play central roles
in Peck v. Greyhound, Bayard Rustin and James Peck. Along with George
Houser, Rustin was a co-organizer of the Journey. Destined to be one of
the major civil rights leaders of the twentieth century, Rustin had been
born in the African American community in West Chester, Pennsylvania,
and at an early age embraced Quakerism,35 which led him to pacifist
circles and then to join FOR in 1941; he quickly rose to be a senior official
in the organization and one of Muste’s trusted lieutenants.36 Rustin was a
complicated and magnetic figure, a brilliant strategist who would play a
major role in the civil rights movement, including organizing Martin
Luther King’s March on Washington in 1963.37 He was also gay, and
worries about this at times led other civil rights leaders unfairly to
marginalize him and his contributions.38 Like several of his FOR
colleagues, Rustin served in prison during World War II for refusing any
form of military service, even the alternative service offered to
conscientious objectors.39 A man of great physical and moral courage,
Rustin had protested segregation well before the Journey. On a bus trip
from Louisville to Nashville in 1942, for instance, he refused to sit in the
back of the bus, receiving a beating from police for his stance.40
James Peck would later be described as “[o]ne of America’s most
colorful radicals.”41 He came from a very different social world than
Rustin—born into wealth and a graduate of The Lawrenceville School, he
dropped out of Harvard and became involved in labor radicalism in the
1930s.42 Peck also refused military service in World War II and served a
prison term, during which he organized a protest to desegregate the prison
cafeteria.43 Peck’s radicalism was not derived from religion—he was an
atheist—but he was active in antiwar and civil rights from the 1940s to the
1980s. After his release from prison in 1945, he soon joined both CORE
and the secular War Resisters’ League, working for both and splitting the
time between the two without a salary.44

35. D’EMILIO, supra note 23, at 25.
36. Id. at 37.
37. See id. at 327–56.
38. Id. at 489–92.
39. Id. at 75–77.
40. Id. at 46–47.
41. BENNETT, supra note 26, at 114.
42. See generally PECK, UNDERDOGS VS. UPPERDOGS, supra note 1, 13–20 and passim.
43. See id. at 70–86
44. Id. at 105.
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B. Segregated Bus Lines, Morgan v. Virginia, and the Journey of
Reconciliation
An obvious target for antiracist protests in the 1940s was segregated
transportation. Buses, like other forms of communal transport, were
segregated across the South.45 Shortly after they developed in the 1910s,
local and intercity bus lines carrying white and African American
passengers were segregated by laws borrowed from those segregating
streetcars.46 Both law and custom sent African American riders in the back
of the bus, in what were the least desirable seats, directly over the back
axle and, in the case of the back row, in seats unable to recline.47 And this
was when the buses would accommodate African American riders at all;
when seats were oversold, African American passengers were ordered to
stand in the aisles, or just told to take the next bus, which might not arrive
for hours.48 Those who did get onto the bus still faced indignities imposed
by racism and heightened by the layout of the bus itself. According to the
historian Mia Bay, quoting Ralph Ellison,
“Almost anything could happen” to Blacks on southern
buses . . . . As they made their way down the “haunted, gauntletlike
passage” to the back of the bus, and even after they sat down, Black
passengers were subject to aggressions that ranged “from push to
shove, assault on hat, heads or aching corns, to unprovoked tongue
lashing from the driver or any white passenger, drunk or sober, who
took exception to their looks, attitude or mere existence.”49

Beginning in the 1930s, the NAACP had targeted laws mandating
segregation on both bus and rail lines, and in 1946, won a major victory in
Morgan v. Virginia, a challenge to Virginia’s law requiring segregated
seating in interstate bus travel.50 In 1944, Irene Morgan, an African
American war worker, was traveling from Gloucester County, Virginia, to
her home in Baltimore when she was ordered to give her seat up to a white
passenger.51 When she refused, police dragged her off the bus and charged
her with both resisting arrest and violating the state’s segregation law.52
The NAACP took her case and appealed it to the Supreme Court, which
45. Some bus lines in Northern states were also segregated. See Bay, supra note 5, at 169–73.
46. See id. at 161–69. Earlier there were both African American bus lines and lines that excluded
African American passengers altogether, but segregation in shared bus transport soon became the
norm. See id.
47. See id. at 186–87.
48. See id. at 188–91.
49. Id. at 187.
50. Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 (1946). On this case, see CATSAM supra note 1, at 14–18,
KLARMAN supra note 2, at 264–66.
51. See BAY, supra note 5, at 230.
52. See id. at 231.
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held that Virginia’s law as applied to interstate travel violated the
Constitution, resting its decision not on the equal protection grounds that
would later be invoked in many cases but on the Constitution’s “dormant
commerce clause” that barred states from imposing undue burdens on
interstate commerce.53 For a state to require segregation of interstate
transport, the Court ruled, was to “unduly burden[] that commerce in
matters where uniformity is necessary.”54 Because different state
requirements might demand passengers repeatedly move their locations,
“a single, uniform rule to promote and protect national travel” was
required.55 State segregation statutes, at least as they applied to individuals
traveling across state lines, were thrown out.
Morgan initially gained “scant attention.”56 Barring only laws
requiring segregation of interstate passengers, it left in place those
imposing segregation in local transport, which was a problem because the
same buses carried both local and interstate passengers. Many bus lines
adopted company policies requiring segregation of all their passengers, a
change permissible under Morgan, which struck down only state
mandates.57 Atlantic Greyhound officials, for instance, “maintained that
since state laws were still in force in regard to intrastate travel, as a
‘practical’ matter they had to continue to segregate all [African American]
passengers.”58 States leapt in to enforce these new rules; Virginia, for
example, passed a new law requiring passengers to obey directions from
bus drivers or be charged with “disorderly conduct.”59 One brave African
American, Wilson Head, attempted to assert his rights under the case when
he rode “a Greyhound bus from Atlanta to Washington, D.C., sitting
wherever he chose,” but he abandoned his effort in Chapel Hill, North
Carolina, after finding himself arrested with police pointing guns at his
head.60 Yet a second challenge to interstate bus segregation was brewing,
one devised by FOR and CORE: the Journey of Reconciliation.
In autumn 1946, CORE had been searching for a project that would,
in the words of its historians August Meier and Elliott Rudwick, provide
the organization “with a national image, arouse the energy of [its local]

53. Morgan, 328 U.S. at 373 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8).
54. Id. at 377.
55. Id. at 386.
56. CATSAM, supra note 1, at 17; see also BAY supra note 5, at 232–33.
57. See CATHERINE A. BARNES, JOURNEY FROM JIM CROW: THE DESEGREGATION OF
SOUTHERN TRANSIT 53 (1983) (“A state statute could be declared unconstitutional as a burden on
commerce, but there was apparently no precedent saying that a carrier rule could similarly violate the
commerce clause.”).
58. MEIER & RUDWICK, supra note 12, at 38.
59. See BAY supra note 5, at 252.
60. CATSAM, supra note 1, at 19.

12

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 45:1

chapters, and bring in money.”61 A challenge to bus segregation was
particularly promising after Morgan, for the Supreme Court’s decision had
produced almost no actual change in Southern practices. “To CORE and
FOR activists, this situation demonstrated the inherent limitations of
legalism, and provided an excellent opportunity to prove the value of
nonviolent direct action.”62 While CORE took the lead, the Journey was a
joint project of both groups, whose membership overlapped so much that
it made little sense to separate them out.63
The plan for the Journey was simple. Sixteen men, eight Black and
eight white, would ride Greyhound and Trailways buses—the two lines
dominating intercity bus transit64 —across the upper South, through
Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Kentucky, refusing to follow the
norms and laws of Jim Crow.65 Each had purchased an interstate bus ticket,
meaning that under Morgan they should not be bound by state laws
mandating segregation in bus transport. The expectation was that they
would meet resistance, ranging from protest to arrest.
In accord with CORE and FOR’s Gandhian philosophy, the
Journey’s intent was not merely to protest segregation, but to make visible
its injustices and highlight publicly its absurdities: “The Journey
dramatized the everyday occurrence of segregation on the buses and
forced racism’s defenders to articulate their positions, which often turned
out to be hopelessly muddled or simply embarrassing.”66 To prepare the
riders for expected abuse and violence, FOR convened a two-day
workshop on how to respond to racial challenges and legal threats, with a
carefully worked out series of steps for the riders to follow which began
with “If you are a Negro, sit in a front seat. If you are white, sit in a rear
seat” and concluded with what to do when arrest came.67 The genuinely
interracial nature of the Journey was essential to its organizers; the riders
were equally divided between white and Black, and the point of the ride
was not just for African Americans to sit in seats reserved for whites, but
for whites to sit in seats usually occupied by African Americans, thereby
erasing the racial hierarchy. CORE practiced, in one historian’s phrase, a
“fastidious interracialism.”68 In a report on the Journey, Houser and Rustin
61. MEIER & RUDWICK, supra note 12, at 34.
62. Id.
63. See generally HOUSER & RUSTIN, supra note 1.
64. See BAY, supra note 5, at 162.
65. The deep South was seen as too dangerous, and women were not included out of fear that
the mixing of African American men and white women was too likely to provoke a violent reaction.
See BAY, supra note 5, at 254.
66. KOSEK, supra note 17, at 206.
67. CATSAM, supra note 1, at 22.
68. KOSEK, supra note 17, at 206.
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later wrote that they “did not allow a single situation to develop so that the
struggle appeared to be between white and Negro persons, but rather that
progressives and democrats, white and black, were working by peaceful
means to overcome a system which they felt to be wrong.”69
The riders left Washington on April 9, 1947, half on a Trailways bus,
half on a Greyhound bus, accompanied by two reporters from African
American newspapers.70 After they entered Virginia they began to take
action, with “interracial groups of two or three [sitting] in both the front
and back of the buses.”71 As they moved south, Journey participants found
increasing hostility from white authorities and passengers (along with
some moments of sympathy). The first arrest occurred in Petersburg,
Virginia, where African American Journey member and attorney, Conrad
Lynn, was arrested after sitting in a section of the bus reserved for whites.
When he tried to explain the Morgan decision to the bus driver who lodged
the complaint, the driver replied that “he worked for the bus company and
not the Supreme Court, and thus he followed company rules regarding
segregation.”72
Further arrests would follow until the Journey concluded back in
Washington.73 Some charges were dropped once the Morgan decision was
brought to local courts’ attention or the riders were removed from a
particular bus.74 Notably, all those arrested were traveling on Trailways
buses and were arrested after complaints by Trailways bus drivers;
“Greyhound officials had decided not to challenge the integrated
groups.”75 This is not because Greyhound wavered on segregating its
buses; Greyhound had a “notorious record when it came to segregation”76
and segregated its southern routes through the 1950s. It may instead reflect
the different organizations of the two bus lines. Trailways was a federation
of locally owned lines operating under a common brand name, making
adoption of a single plan difficult. Greyhound, in contrast, was a national
corporation, operating through subsidiary lines, so top Greyhound
management may have been able to instruct bus drivers to avoid the bad
publicity generated by arrests of the riders. The only violence encountered
during the Journey (though much was threatened) was in Chapel Hill,
69. HOUSER & RUSTIN, supra note 1, at 11.
70. CATSAM, supra note 1, at 24.
71. Id. at 24.
72. Id. at 25. Lynn was charged not with violating segregation laws, but disorderly conduct for
refusing the bus driver’s orders, as all state laws empowered bus drivers to tell passengers where to
sit. See BAY, supra note 5, at 154.
73. CATSAM, supra note 1, at 25–26.
74. See id. at 32–34.
75. Id. at 27.
76. BAY, supra note 5, at 179.
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where Peck was assaulted by a white bystander.77 The riders did not all
escape consequences. While charges were often dropped, some were not.
Three of the riders, Rustin, Igor Roodenko, and Joseph Felmet, were
eventually convicted of violating North Carolina’s segregation laws after
state courts concluded that because they had made stops in North Carolina
they were intra-state, and not interstate, passengers, and in 1949 the men
served almost a month on a chain gang.78
In retrospect, the Journey was an early herald of the civil rights
movement of the 1950s, with its emphasis on nonviolent resistance, and
the far more consequential Freedom Rides of 1961–1962, interracial bus
journeys through the deep South that CORE would organize, which finally
led to widespread rejection of segregated transportation (Peck was the sole
participant in both the Journal of Reconciliation and the later Freedom
Rides).79 At the time, though, the Journey made little impression.
Coverage was extensive in the African American press, less so in white
newspapers.80 Much later, Houser would conclude “[i]t was a creative
project . . . ahead of its time.”81 The Journey had at least one surprising
consequence, though, when Peck and Rustin carried their civil rights battle
from Southern roads to an unexpected battlefield: a shareholder meeting.
To understand how they wound up there, we need to understand the laws
governing shareholders and the corporation.
II. SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS AND SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY
A. The Place of the Shareholder in the Twentieth Century Corporation
In the middle of the twentieth century, shareholders held an
ambiguous place in the American corporation. In corporation law, they
had always been treated as the corporation’s owners82 and given a central
role in governance, charged with electing the Board which in turn oversaw
the corporation and named the officers who actually ran it. 83 What this
77. PECK, FREEDOM RIDE, supra note 1, at 20.
78. CATSAM, supra note 1, at 36–38, 41. A fourth rider was convicted as well but refused to
return to North Carolina to serve his sentence. See id.
79. While Morgan helped chip away at the legal structure of segregated transportation, the actual
elimination of segregation in busing was a complicated produce of court decisions, regulatory changes,
mass civil disobedience beginning with the Montgomery Bus Boycott in 1956, and the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. See BARNES, supra note 57, at 176–93 & passim; BAY, supra note 5, at 268–303.
80. CATSAM, supra note 1, at 43.
81. Id.
82. There has also been extensive academic criticism of the description of shareholders as
“owners” of the corporation, but this persists as the traditional and widely held view. See, e.g., Julian
Velasco, Shareholder Ownership and Primacy, 2010 ILL. L. REV. 902, 903.
83. Though even here the rules changed somewhat; the common law’s default rule had been one
shareholder, one vote, but this evolved over the nineteenth century to a widespread one share, one vote
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meant in practice had changed over time. In the nineteenth century, the
law treated shareholders as the fundamental governors of the corporation,
possessing ultimate authority and making certain essential decisions, most
importantly electing directors at regular, usually annual, meetings.84
Because it was the site where decisions were to be made, shareholders’
meetings were treated by law as deliberative assemblies, and a
shareholder’s right to attend the meeting and participate in discussions
over corporate affairs was a basic one. As one turn of the twentieth century
treatise put it, “The general meeting of a corporation is a deliberative body;
and hence reasonable debate must be allowed, and the minority cannot be
cut short until after a reasonable opportunity for presenting their views.”85
This view, however, presumed that a corporation had a relatively
small number of shareholders mostly living in the same geographic region
and with the ability and economic incentive to attend meetings and debate
corporate policy.86 By the early twentieth century this was no longer the
case, at least at many large corporations.87 Share ownership started rising
at the turn of the century and exploded beginning in the 1920s, with over
eight million individuals owning shares by midcentury, which meant more
and more shareholders owning smaller and smaller stakes in
corporations.88 One study found that by 1928, 124 of the nation’s largest
200 corporations had at least 5,000 shareholders, with 32 having over
50,000.89 In corporations with thousands of shareholders who were often
widely scattered across the country, active shareholder participation in
governance was often impossible and economically irrational. A
shareholder owning only a few shares in a corporation would see little
benefit from taking an active interest in the corporation, much less
default. See generally Colleen Dunlavy, From Citizens to Plutocrats: Nineteenth-century Shareholder
Voting Rights and Theories of the Corporation, in CONSTRUCTING CORPORATE AMERICA: HISTORY,
POLITICS, CULTURE 66–86 (Lipartito and Sicilia eds., 2003).
84. See, e.g., 2 VICTOR MORAWETZ, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 448
(1886) (“It is implied that the majority shall have supreme authority to direct the policy of the
corporation in attaining its chartered purposes, and shall have the power to appoint the usual managing
agents, to whom immediate control and direction of the company’s business is delegated.”).
85. 2 ARTHUR MACHEN, A TREATISE ON THE MODERN LAW OF CORPORATIONS 1060 (1908);
accord 2 MORAWETZ, supra note 84, at 453.
86. Even in the nineteenth century this was not true of all corporations. See, e.g., Eric Hilt, When
Did Ownership Separate from Control? Corporate Governance in the Early-Nineteenth Century, 68
J. ECON. HIST. 645 (2008).
87. The growth of large corporations has been well-documented. See generally, e.g., GLENN
PORTER, THE RISE OF BIG BUSINESS, 1860–1920 (3d ed. 2005). That said, this development was
uneven, and we can certainly find counterexamples of large corporations with controlling
shareholders, or without dispersed ownership, through the twentieth century. See Brian Cheffins and
Steven Bank, Is Berle and Means Really a Myth?, 83 BUS. HIST. REV. 449 (2009).
88. J.A. LIVINGSTON, THE AMERICAN STOCKHOLDER 24–25 (1958).
89. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 18, at 50.
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traveling to the annual meeting. As a result, most shareholders stopped
attending them. In 1938, for example, AT&T had 646,882 shareholders,
but less than one-tenth of one percent of them attended the firm’s annual
meeting.90 As a result, power in many corporations shifted from
shareholders to management—a change dubbed the “separation of
ownership and control” in Berle and Means’s landmark 1932 work The
Modern Corporation and Private Property.91
The mechanism that allowed managers to assume power was the
proxy. While attendance at meetings dropped, shareholders’ votes could
not be dispensed with altogether, as they were needed to elect directors,
and quorum requirements often required a certain percentage of shares be
voted at the annual meeting.92 To address this issue, management usually
wrote and asked shareholders for the right to cast their votes in absentia at
an upcoming meeting—for the shareholders’ “proxy”—and shareholders,
if they bothered to reply at all, usually gave management the right to cast
the votes as it chose.93 Before the 1930s, little regulation governed such
proxy voting. Management was not required to tell shareholders the details
of what was to be considered at an annual meeting nor how a proxy given
to management would be voted,94 and in a typical election the only party
requesting a proxy would be management.95 Proxy contests, in which
different factions vying for control of the corporation competed for
shareholders’ proxies, did occur, but were rare, and while management
could pay for their proxy requests from corporate funds, challengers had
to pay their own expenses.96 Through the proxy machinery, shareholders
90. Rolf Enno Wubbels, Regulation of Stockholder Proxies 3 (1949) (Ph.D. dissertation, New
York University).
91. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 18, at 2. Berle and Means actually spoke of “control” being
separated from ownership and thought that control was not always lodged in management, see id. at
92, but in popular understanding the idea grew that control had moved from shareholders to
management, which was indeed often the case.
92. Some corporations had adopted quorum requirements, meaning a certain percentage of
shares had to be cast to make an action valid, but even those without such requirements apparently
sought shareholder votes. HENRY WINTHROP BALLANTINE, BALLANTINE ON CORPORATIONS 562
(1927). For an account of the evolution of the shareholders’ meeting, see Janette Rutterford, The
Shareholders’ Voice: British and American Accents 1890–1965, 13 ENT. & SOC. 120, 132–34 (2012).
Rutterford makes the interesting point that shareholder meetings became more important for U.S.
corporations from the 1920s to the 1960s, but as public relations exercises, not governance meetings.
Id.
93. While proxy voting was not allowed in common law, statutes and corporate bylaws generally
provided for it by this period. BALLANTINE, supra note 92, at 576.
94. A sample proxy form “in frequent use” provided in one standard work simply stated the
proxy had been granted and provided no details on how it was to be voted. Id. at 576–77. See also 2
MACHEN, supra note 85, at 1041 (1908) (“In the absence of any express provisions as to the form of
proxies, no particular form is requisite.”).
95. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 18, at 81–82.
96. See id. at 87–88.
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handed over their votes and management cast them as it pleased. As Berle
and Means put it, the proxy machinery became “one of the principal
instruments not by which a stockholder exercises power over the
management of the enterprise, but by which his power is separated from
him.”97 According to another observer, “The routine conduct of corporate
meetings, reelection of directors, and the like, with successful
corporations, is for management of a large concern usually a matter of
form. The presence and participation of shareholders directly in such
corporations has of course become a thing of the past . . . .”98 So far had
power shifted from shareholders to managers that many annual meetings
were planned to discourage shareholder attendance—corporations
scheduled their shareholders’ meetings for the same day, for instance, or
held them in out-of-the-way locations.99
Federal law in the 1930s changed this—a bit. The Crash of 1929 and
the Great Depression led Congress to adopt the Securities Act of 1933 and
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which imposed additional rules on
corporations whose operations until then had been governed almost
completely by state law.100 The Acts placed a new emphasis on detailed
disclosure of corporate information to shareholders of the publicly traded
corporations covered by the Acts. Section 14 of the 1934 Act empowered
the new Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to set out rules for
proxies to avoid the “common practice” where stockholders would “sign
proxies blindly, thereby enabling the management of a corporation to
perpetuate itself, without giving the stockholders a fair opportunity to vote
intelligently on major matters of policy.”101 In 1938, the SEC used the
power granted under this section to issue Regulation X-14, which required
management, when requesting proxies from shareholders, to give them as
well a “proxy statement” including such basic information as the issues
that would be voted on by the proxy-holder and giving the shareholder for
the first time the power to cast her proxy vote against a particular proposed
course of action.102 But none of these changes really altered the corporate

97. Id. at 129.
98. WILLIAM Z. RIPLEY, MAIN STREET AND WALL STREET 145 (1927).
99. See J.A. LIVINGSTON, THE AMERICAN STOCKHOLDER 83–84 (1958).
100. See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77 (1933); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. § 78 (1934).
101. CHARLES H. MEYER, THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 ANALYZED AND
EXPLAINED 104 (1934).
102. Sheldon E. Bernstein and Henry G. Fischer, The Regulation of the Solicitation of Proxies:
Some Reflections on Corporate Democracy, 7 U. CHI. L. REV. 226, 233 (1940) (including Regulation
14X and its rules as an appendix). The SEC had first adopted proxy rules under Securities Exchange
Act § 14 in 1935, but these simply banned false and misleading statements, and the 1938 rules were
seen as the first ones to impose significant limits on managers seeking shareholder proxies. See id. at
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balance of power; managers still dominated and shareholders usually
acquiesced. Thus, the shareholder’s ambiguous role: the law still
embodied a view of the corporation where shareholders were vitally
involved in its operations, but the economic reality was that management
controlled most large firms and shareholders’ involvement was
perfunctory.
B. Shareholder Democracy and the Shareholder Proposal Rule
Beginning in the late 1930s, a handful of activists appeared who
aimed to revitalize the shareholder’s role in the corporation, giving rise to
a movement for “shareholder democracy” that briefly flourished in the
1940s and 1950s.103 The movement can be traced to shareholder activist
Lewis Gilbert.104 In the early 1930s, Gilbert, an independently wealthy
journalist, inherited shares in over 100 companies and, with time on his
hands, decided to attend shareholder meetings and share with management
his ideas for improving the operations of the firm.105 He was able to do this
because, while the reality of shareholder government had changed, the law
had not—shareholders were still entitled to attend the annual meeting and
address management and fellow shareholders (those few who attended)
from the floor.106 His ideas were not that radical; the changes he favored
mainly aimed to improve oversight and management by, for example,
allowing shareholders to choose the corporation’s auditors, requiring all
directors to own shares in their corporations, and moving annual
shareholder meetings to more easily accessible locales.107 Surprised to find
managers uninterested in his input, Gilbert soon took up shareholder
activism full-time, attending dozens of annual meetings each year and
making proposals from the floor for shareholders to consider and vote
upon, something again allowed by corporation law. These invariably went
down to defeat, which is not surprising considering that, thanks to the

229; see also Arthur H. Dean, Non-Compliance with Proxy Regulations, 24 CORNELL L. Q. 483
(1939).
103. See, e.g., LIVINGSTON, supra note 18, at 61–109; EMERSON & LATCHAM, supra note 13.
The term “shareholder democracy” is contested; one useful article questioning the analogy of
shareholder to political suffrage is Usha Rodrigues, The Seductive Comparison of Shareholder and
Civic Democracy, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1389 (2006).
104. See LAUREN TALNER, THE ORIGINS OF SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM 1–5 (1983); John
Bainbridge, The Talking Stockholder—I, NEW YORKER, Dec. 11, 1948, at 40 [hereinafter Bainbridge,
The Talking Stockholder—I]; John Bainbridge, The Talking Stockholder—II, NEW YORKER, Dec. 18,
1948, at 33 [hereinafter Bainbridge, The Talking Stockholder—II].
105. See TALNER, supra note 104, at 1–5.
106. BALLANTINE, supra note 92, at 564.
107. EMERSON & LATCHAM, supra note 13, at 113–14.
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proxy machinery, management controlled the vast majority of votes cast
at a meeting.108
Gilbert, however, then hit on a clever approach that ultimately
created a powerful tool for dissident shareholders: the shareholder
proposal. Under the SEC’s rules, when management sent shareholders its
proxy statement asking for power to cast the shareholders’ votes, it was
required to provide details about how those proxies would be voted.109
Usually this meant simply disclosing who, for instance, management
planned to elect to the Board. In 1939, however, Gilbert informed the
management of Bethlehem Steel that he planned to make a proposal at its
annual meeting to move future meetings from relatively inaccessible
Wilmington, Delaware, to New York City.110 When the company’s
management sent shareholders a proxy statement that did not mention
Gilbert’s proposal, he protested to the SEC. He argued that because it did
not tell shareholders of Gilbert’s proposal or Bethlehem’s intent to vote
against it, the proxy statement was misleading and so violated the SEC
rules. The SEC agreed, reasoning that, because Gilbert “[h]ad notified the
company of his intention in advance . . . Bethlehem Steel should have
disclosed this” when soliciting proxies.111 Henceforward, shareholders
who planned to make a proposal at a corporation’s annual meeting could,
by informing the corporation of this in advance, compel the corporation to
include the proposal in its proxy statement, in effect requiring management
to circulate the shareholder proposal at management’s expense.112
At the end of 1942, the SEC codified its informal guidance about
shareholder proposals in its new “shareholder proposal rule,” Rule X-14A7 (now 14a-8), which required that, when a shareholder had notified a
corporation that the shareholder intended to present a proposal at the
annual meeting, management had to “set forth the proposal and provide
means by which” shareholders could vote for or against it in the proxy
statement.113 If management opposed the proposal and intended to vote
proxies against it, it still had to “include in [its] soliciting material the
name and address of such security holder [submitting the proposal] and a
statement . . . setting forth the reasons advanced by him in support of such
108. See id.
109. See Nicholas, supra note 6, at 109.
110. Id.
111. Id.; see also Dean, supra note 102, at 503–04; Bethlehem Steel Adjourns Meeting, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 12, 1939, at 33.
112. Emerson and Latcham indicate that by 1940, the SEC had changed a definition rule to make
clear that proxy solicitations had to notify shareholders of shareholder proposals expected to be made
at annual meetings but provide no details. EMERSON & LATCHAM, supra note 13, at 92.
113. Securities Act Release No. 33-2887, Exchange Act Release No. 34-3347, Investment
Company Act Release No. 35-3988, 1942 WL 34864 (Dec. 18, 1942).
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proposal” not to exceed 100 words.114 There were limits—a proposal had
to be “a proper subject for action by security holders,” a requirement
whose meaning would be fought over in coming years—but it was still an
extraordinary development.115 Even the smallest shareholder could now
have a voice in corporate governance.
Why the SEC adopted such a seemingly radical rule remains unclear.
The rule was proposed in 1942, long after the heyday of the New Deal,
when government efforts had moved away from domestic reform and
towards winning World War II.116 But the SEC was an outlier. It had been
evacuated to Philadelphia for the duration, perhaps shielding its plans from
scrutiny, and several of the five Commissioners running it were former
SEC staffers who had been at the agency during its pro-shareholder zenith
in the 1930s.117 The rule was one of a package of proposed changes that
would, if adopted, have remade U.S. corporate governance, all of which
appear to have been the work of an attorney in the Commission’s General
Counsel’s office, Milton V. Freeman.118 The changes would have required
more detailed disclosure of executive compensation, forbidden
management from voting unmarked proxies, and, in a sharp challenge to
management power, allowed shareholders to use management’s proxy
statements to nominate their own candidates for director.119 The proposals
produced fierce opposition,120 culminating in Congressional hearings
where Freeman was accused of having “alleged communist
sympathies.”121 After this, the Commission rejected most of the proposed
changes but adopted the shareholder proposal rule, perhaps because it was
less threatening than the other proposed changes. Its advocates hoped it
would inject a measure of democracy into corporations; in 1943, SEC
Commissioner Robert O’Brien spoke of the need to “create an informed
and active group of shareholders who have a voice in the councils of their
own corporation.”122
In practice, the rule did not do much. For one, it was not at first clear
what proposals were allowed under the rule. According to the SEC’s 1942
release adopting the rule, a proposal had to be a “proper subject for action

114. Id.
115. Id.
116. See id.
117. See JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF THE
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE 238 (3d ed. 2003).
118. A detailed account of these developments, which guides my account here, is provided in
Nicholas, supra note 6, at 109–26.
119. Securities Act Release No. 33-2887, supra note 113.
120. SELIGMAN, supra note 117, at 236–38.
121. Id. at 238.
122. LIVINGSTON, supra note 18, at 68.
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by the security holders,” but it did not explain what that meant.123 In 1945,
the SEC provided further guidance when an unnamed corporation asked
the agency if it could omit three shareholder proposals unrelated to its
operations (one asked that dividends not be subject to the Federal income
tax while another called for reform of the antitrust laws).124 The agency
responded that the rule was intended to allow shareholders “to bring before
their fellow stockholders matters of concern to them as stockholders in
such corporation . . . relating to the affairs of the company concerned as
are proper subjects for stockholders’ action . . . ,” not for matters “of a
general political, social or economic nature.”125 Yet the rule was still
broad; shareholders could make proposals not only concerning matters
clearly within their powers under corporate law, but even on matters that
corporate law assigned for the Board to decide, so long as the proposals
were phrased as suggestions rather than commands that the Board act.126
In 1947 and 1948, the SEC made further minor amendments, for instance
making clear that a corporation could reject a proposal to “[enforce] a
personal claim . . . or grievance” against the corporation.127 More
significant, the rules were amended to require a corporation planning to
omit an “improper” shareholder proposal from its proxy materials to first
notify the SEC and provide “a statement of the reasons why the
management deems such omission to be proper.”128
The rule also fell short of its authors’ hopes because shareholder
proposals were rarely made and almost never won. One study found that
from 1943 to 1947, only 91 out of the 6,380 proxy statements filed with
the SEC included a shareholder proposal—1.4% of the total.129 From 1948
to 1951, the figure was 177 out of 6,755 proxy statements—a slight rise to
2.7%.130 The vast majority of the proposals focused on improving
corporate operations.131 253 of the 286 proposals made in 1948–1951,
88%,132 called for one of four classic governance reforms: shareholder
selection of auditors, moving the annual meeting, post-meeting reports to
123. Securities Act Release No. 33-2887, supra note 113..
124. Exchange Act Release No. 34-3638, supra note 8.
125. Id.
126. EMERSON & LATCHAM, supra note 13, at 101; see also SEC v. Transamerica Corp., 163
F.2d 511, 518 (3d Cir. 1947) (requiring corporation to include in its proxy shareholder proposals that
“are subjects in respect to which shareholders have the right to act under” the law of the state of
incorporation).
127. Exchange Act Release No. 34-4185, 1948 WL 28695 (Nov. 5, 1948).
128. Id. (in 1948, the SEC renumbered the shareholder proposal rule from X-14A-7 to X-14A8).
129. EMERSON & LATCHAM, supra note 13, at 102.
130. See id.
131. See id.
132. There were 286 proposals, but 177 proxy statements with proposals, because some proxy
statements included multiple proposals. See id.
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shareholders, or cumulative share voting.133 Furthermore, most of the
proposals were made by a small band of activist shareholders; since the
early 1930s, Lewis Gilbert had been joined by a handful of other
“gadflies,” including his brother, John Gilbert, and Wilma Soss, head of
the Federation of Women Shareholders in American Business, Inc., who
made several proposals asking firms to name a female director.134 47% of
all shareholder proposals in this period were made by the Gilberts.135
Nearly all these proposals lost. Of the 232 proposals for which vote results
were disclosed, only seven proposals (2.3%) received a majority
shareholder vote, and most of those had gained support from
management.136
Almost completely absent were any shareholder proposals asking
corporations to take action impinging on larger social issues. Indeed, one
survey could identify only one: the proposal made by James Peck and
Bayard Rustin at Greyhound.137
III. SHAREHOLDER VOICES AND CIVIL RIGHTS
A. Going to the Meeting
Before leaving on the Journey of Reconciliation in April 1947, Peck
later recalled,
Bayard Rustin and I each bought a share of Greyhound stock at
approximately $30. Purpose of the trip was to challenge the
segregated seating system on interstate buses in light of the 1946
Irene Morgan decision of the U.S. Supreme Court. Purpose of our
buying the stock was to carry the challenge to the Greyhound
stockholders.138

He did not say how he and Rustin got the idea of carrying their
activism to shareholders. At the time they purchased their shares the new
shareholder proposal rule was barely four years old, and the shareholder
133. Id. at 101–03.
134. Id. at 104–05. Soss is a fascinating figure; contemporary accounts often mocked the idea of
a woman who was interested in corporate governance, but looking back, she was perhaps the first
advocate for diverse representation on corporate boards. See June Sochen, Wilma Porter Soss, AM.
NAT’L BIOGRAPHY (1999); Janice Traflet, Queen of the Corporate Gadflies: The Unstoppable Wilma
Soss, 119 FIN. HIST. 20, 21–23 (2016).
135. EMERSON & LATCHAM, supra note 13, at 113.
136. Id. at 112.
137. See id. at 114–17. One SEC staffer identified two other “social issues” proposals from this
era, one asking that a company stop investing in liquor stocks, the other that women be given the same
pension rights as men. Harry Heller, Stockholder Proposals, 4 VA. L. WKLY. DICTA COMPILATION 72,
73–74 (1953).
138. Peck, supra note 4, at 375.
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gadflies had as yet attracted little media attention.139 Perhaps Peck, who
was heir to a fortune and supported by a trust fund, was exposed to the
mechanics of shareholding and proxy statements—but no real evidence
backs this up.140 While we cannot know the origins of their shareholder
activism, Peck was clear about why they were doing it: “‘What’s the use
of all this effort?’ The answer is—‘Publicity!’”141
While a shareholder meeting may seem an incongruous place for a
civil rights protest, Peck and Rustin had chosen a site surprisingly well
suited for the kind of protests pioneered by FOR and CORE. Whatever the
economic realities, shareholder meetings still retained their democratic
origins as a space for every shareholder to attend and voice his or her
opinion as to how the corporation was run.142 They regularly attracted
newspaper coverage, though usually in the business pages. All this made
shareholder meetings ripe for the kind of activism developed by CORE,
which aimed not merely to register disapproval of segregation but to create
“ritual and spectacle” that would shine a harsh light on underlying
injustice. While it would be absurd to compare a segregated bus or
restaurant to a shareholders’ meeting, the protest tactics developed for one
could with modification be applied to the other. 143
Peck and Rustin’s experiences in FOR and CORE help explain one
otherwise puzzling aspect of the protest: Rustin’s central role. Peck was
heir to a fortune and could be expected to own shares, but at the time of
the protests Rustin was receiving a small salary from FOR.144 Yet both
men bought Greyhound shares. It is likely that Rustin’s involvement
reflects CORE and FOR’s commitment to interracial activism. As shown
in the Journey, the organizations’ protests aimed not merely at objecting
to segregation but doing so in interracial alliances that confounded racist
assumptions. The group riding through the South was carefully balanced
by race, and their protests involved not just African American riders sitting
in the front of a segregated bus but white riders sitting in the back, and
participants of different races sitting side by side.145 Rustin’s active
involvement in the Greyhound shareholder protests similarly made it
visibly interracial, a joint project of both men.
139. In 1948, Gilbert would earn a long profile in The New Yorker, but this appeared after the
two civil rights activists had already attended their first shareholder meeting. Bainbridge, The Talking
Stockholder—I, supra note 104; Bainbridge, The Talking Stockholder—II, supra note 104.
140. See PECK, UNDERDOGS VS. UPPERDOGS, supra note 1, at 11.
141. Peck, supra note 4, at 377.
142. See supra Section II.A.
143. KOSEK, supra note 17, at 259; MEIER & RUDWICK, supra note 12, at 49–50.
144. Rustin’s position at CORE was unpaid, and when he worked for FOR he could afford only
a tenement apartment in New York. D’EMILIO, supra note 23, at 174.
145. See CATSAM, supra note 1, at 21.
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CORE’s approach explained who protested, but it was corporation
law that dictated their target. The Journey’s riders had traveled on both of
the South’s major intercity bus lines, Greyhound and Trailways, but all the
riders arrested had been riding on Trailways buses.146 The riders taking
Greyhound went almost completely unscathed, as the bus line’s
management told its drivers not to complain when Journey members broke
the corporation’s rules.147 When time came for the shareholders’ protest,
however, Trailways could not be a target because it was not a public
corporation; Trailways was a network of some forty independently owned
bus companies operating cooperatively under a common name.148 There
were no Trailways shares available on the open market, no Trailways
shareholders’ meeting to attend, and no public corporation bound by SEC
rules. Any protest based on purchasing shares and using the shareholder
proposal rule had to be against a public corporation: Greyhound.149
In 1948, Peck attended Greyhound’s annual shareholder meeting in
Wilmington, Delaware; Rustin was unable to be there so his place was
taken by Louis Redding, head of the Wilmington NAACP, whose presence
guaranteed that the proposal was made by an interracial team.150 Apart
from Greyhound management, only five shareholders were present
including Peck and Redding.151 The two men attempted to offer a proposal
asking the company to abolish “the illegal practice of segregated seating”
and to instruct its employees that “enforcement of jimcrow [sic] seating
will no longer be tolerated.”152 They told the other attendees of their arrests
during the Journey of Reconciliation and warned that “[m]ore and more
colored passengers were standing up for their legal rights and this [would]
increase the number of damage suits and expenditures by the company.”153
While management apparently listened to their speech, it refused to put
their proposal up for a vote, pointing to state and federal laws to claim that
“[because the] matter was not mentioned in the notice of the meeting or in

146. See id. at 26–27.
147. See supra Section I.B.
148. OSCAR SCHISGALL, THE GREYHOUND STORY: FROM HIBBING TO EVERYWHERE 54–55
(1985).
149. Greyhound operated through a network of partially- and wholly-owned regional bus lines.
See id. at 86.
150. Peck, supra note 4, at 375. Redding was a major civil rights attorney and argued one of the
cases consolidated in Brown v. Board of Education. See Omari Scott Simmons, Chancery’s Greatest
Decision: Historical Insights on Civil Rights and the Future of Shareholder Activism, 76 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 1259, 1273–74 & passim (2019).
151. Peck, supra note 4, at 375.
152. Racial Discrimination Issue up at Greyhound Meeting, WALL ST. J., May 19, 1948, at 4.
While today the label for segregation is “Jim Crow,” the term “jimcrow” was in common usage at the
time. See, e.g., id.
153. Bus Line Jimcrowism Rapped, PHILA. TRIB., May 25, 1948, at 9.
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the proxy statement no formal action could be taken at the meeting.”154
Peck and Rustin skipped the next year’s shareholders meeting, likely
because in April 1949, Rustin was finishing a month-long sentence on a
North Carolina chain gang imposed during the Journey, but they planned
to return in 1950.155
B. The Greyhound Proposal and Peck v. Greyhound
Peck and Rustin must have spent some time studying the shareholder
proposal rule after the 1948 meeting, for in the fall of 1949 they led
thirteen shareholders (many apparently FOR supporters who had bought
Greyhound shares) in submitting a shareholder proposal for Greyhound’s
1950 meeting entitled “Compliance with the 1946 decision of the U.S.
Supreme Court (in the Irene Morgan case) outlawing jimcrow seating in
interstate bus travel.”156 SEC rules were clear about when a proposal
should be submitted and how a corporation could respond. It had to be
submitted in a “reasonable time” before the corporation mailed
shareholders its proxy solicitation,157 and the corporation could reject it
only if it fell into one of the categories defined by the SEC, such as if it
involved a “personal grievance” or involved matters of a “general political,
social, or economic nature.”158 If a corporation did decide to exclude a
proposal, it had to notify both the SEC and the shareholder by the day the
proxy statement was filed with the SEC—at least ten days before it was to
be sent to shareholders—and provide “a statement of the reasons why the
management deems such omission to be proper in the particular case.”159
So began a long tug-of-war over the proposal. After submitting their
proposal in late 1949, Peck and Rustin began negotiations with Greyhound
over its exact wording, but following several exchanges Greyhound in
early 1950 decided to exclude the proposal from its proxy statement as
“not a proper subject for action by the stockholders, or upon which the
stockholders could vote.”160 Greyhound then notified the SEC of its
decision and SEC staff responded with a letter informing Greyhound that
the proposal could be excluded.161 The SEC only agreed with Greyhound’s
154. Racial Discrimination Issue up at Greyhound Meeting, supra note 152.
155. See D’EMILIO, supra note 23, at 169–70.
156. CORE Press Release, December 22, 1949, CORE Papers (quoting letter from Greyhound
Secretary Merrill Buffington). No copy of the entire text of the proposal has been located, though its
title is quoted in CORE materials.
157. The rule included a safe harbor defining this as at least sixty days before the date of the
previous year’s shareholder meeting.
158. See Exchange Act Release No. 34-4185, 1948 WL 28695 (Nov. 5, 1948).
159. See id.
160. Stockholders Picket Greyhound Bus Meet, N.Y. AMSTERDAM NEWS, May 20, 1950, at 34.
161. Letter from George M. Houser to Martin A. Martin, supra note 4; see also SEC Minutes,
Mar. 22, 1950 (quoted in Nicholas, supra note 6, at 183). Such letters authored by SEC staffers, later
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decision, however, because it found Peck and Rustin had filed their final
proposal too late; Peck reported receiving a letter from the SEC in March
1950 stating the proposal was “a proper subject for action by
stockholders.”162 Peck and Rustin still showed up to the Greyhound annual
meeting in May 1950, however, this time using the civil rights strategy of
leafleting and picketing to draw attention, holding signs that read
“Greyhound Corp. unfair to Negroes” and “Greyhound Follows the
Dixiecrat Party Line.”163
In October 1950, well in advance of Greyhound’s 1951 shareholders’
meeting, Peck and Rustin again submitted their proposal to the company.
Greyhound responded as expected, notifying Peck and Rustin, as well as
the SEC, that it planned to exclude the proposal, relying on the earlier SEC
pronouncement allowing omission of proposals of a “general political,
social, or economic nature.”164 Greyhound’s letter is revealing. The
company argued that the proposal was not just improper under the rules,
but threatened to create terrible publicity for the bus line:
If the proposal should be adopted, it is apparent it could and would
be used by Mr. Peck and his organization as propaganda to bring
pressure to bear to force the management to act on the
recommendation . . . and institute a social reform . . . .
If the proposal should be voted down, Mr. Peck could use that fact as
propaganda to discredit Greyhound . . . .
We feel that to permit Mr. Peck to submit this proposal to our
stockholders would be likely to cause irreparable damage to our
business, because whatever action is taken would place Mr. Peck and
the Congress of Racial Equality in a position to charge that
Greyhound is opposed to the abolition of segregation.165

This time, the SEC staff changed its mind. In a March 8, 1951 letter
to Greyhound, Henry Heller, an assistant director at the SEC and a
specialist on the shareholder proposal rule, wrote that normally,
stockholders “should not be denied the right of making suggestions and
recommendations for consideration by the management of a company . . . .
On this basis, we previously advised Mr. Peck that a proposal regarding
called “no action letters,” were not formal rulings by the Commission but still had, and have,
significant weight. See Donna Nagy, Judicial Reliance on Regulatory Interpretations in SEC NoAction Letters, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 921 (1998).
162. Peck, supra note 4, at 375–76. There was later some dispute as to whether the SEC agreed
that the proposal was a “proper subject” for shareholders, but Peck’s report is supported by SEC
records. See Nicholas, supra note 6, at 183 & n.66.
163. N.Y. AMSTERDAM NEWS, supra note 160.
164. Exchange Act Release No. 34-3638, supra note 8. (Jan. 3, 1945).
165. Peck, supra note 4, at 378 (quoting Greyhound’s letter).
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segregated seating on buses would appear to be a ‘proper subject for
action.’”166 Since then, however, the Commission’s lawyers had
reconsidered. “[S]ome proposals may be improper under the rule,
particularly if they are in fact urged for propaganda purposes or to require
the management to in effect to take consensus of stockholders in respect
to what is essentially a general political, social or economic problem.”167
Based on this analysis, Heller told Greyhound, “the Commission has asked
me to advise you that it agrees with your position that the
proposal . . . need not be included in your proxy statement.”168
This about-face was an early sign that the SEC had begun to sour on
the shareholder proposal rule. When the Commission first adopted the rule
in 1942, the Commission was still headed by a high-caliber group of
former staffers who retained some commitment to corporate reform, but
by 1950, its leadership had changed. President Truman’s appointees to the
five-member Commission tended to be his cronies—men with little
knowledge of the securities laws.169 Harry MacDonald, for instance, chair
of the SEC from 1949 to 1952, was a friend of Truman’s who was in the
dairy business before joining the Commission.170 Such men lacked an
appetite for using the securities laws to change how corporations were run.
Nor were their successors during the more conservative, pro-business
Eisenhower years any more likely to embrace reform. Thus, even as the
gadflies attracted press attention and a small academic industry sprang up
around “shareholder democracy,”171 serious proposals to alter the balance
of power within the corporation and rein in managerial authority became
ever less likely.
The letter also showed the SEC adopting a new and narrower
conception of what actions were proper for shareholders.172 It agreed that

166. Press Release, Cong. Racial Equal., SEC Reverses Self; Backs Greyhound’s Taboo on
Jimcrow Issue (Mar. 22, 1951) (quoting letter from Henry Heller to Merrill Buffington, secretary,
Greyhound Corporation). I have found no copy of Heller’s letter, and as of this writing the National
Archives, which houses SEC records, is closed due to COVID-19. I therefore rely on quotations from
the letter in this press release. Because the SEC’s responses to a corporate request to exclude a proposal
were sent to both the corporation and the proposal’s proponents, I believe CORE had a copy of the
letter itself at one time.
167. Id.
168. Id. After receiving the Greyhound letter, it appears Peck also wrote to Baldwin Bane,
director of the SEC’s Division of Corporate Finance, and was rebuffed. See Letter from George M.
Houser to Martin A. Martin, supra note 4. Brief quotations from the Greyhound and SEC letters appear
in Peck v. Greyhound Corp., 97 F. Supp. 679, 680 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
169. See Seligman, supra note 117, at 243–44.
170. Id.
171. See Wells, supra note 13, at 339–45.
172. While Heller had signed the letter, he wrote that he had been asked to do so by “the
Commission,” and SEC records indicate it was discussed by at least two Commissioners when sent.
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the proposal could be excluded because it addressed “a general political,
social or economic problem.” But that misdescribed Peck and Rustin’s
proposal. The men had been careful to target their proposals not at
segregation in general, but at the segregation policy adopted by
Greyhound, which they argued harmed that corporation by opening it up
to lawsuits by riders illegally discriminated against.173 They were right; as
the historian Catherine Barnes reports, after Morgan and other cases,
African American plaintiffs began suing bus and train lines alleging:
unequal conditions on public transit . . . segregation itself if they
were interstate passengers . . . for damages if segregation policies
were enforced in a discriminatory or abusive manner; and . . . [for]
breach of contract when forced to move from their reserved seats on
buses or trains to Jim Crow sections.174

“In February 1944, for example, a black aviation plant worker won a
$1,500 judgment in a federal district court because she had refused to
move to the rear of a Dixie Greyhound bus in Arkansas . . . .”175 The
problem with the Greyhound proposal, it seems, is that while it targeted
Greyhound’s policies it also touched on a broader social issue. Under the
SEC’s approach, a proposal would be acceptable only if it were completely
unrelated to such issues. Writing in a law school publication in 1953, SEC
attorney Harry Heller acknowledged as much. “[T]he purposes [of the
letter] appeared germane to the business of the company, . . . .” Heller
wrote, but he defended the Commission’s decision by saying that “the
Commission determined that the primary motive of the stockholder was
the advancement of a cause with which the stockholder had a close
association, rather than the solution of a problem pertinent solely to the
corporation itself.”176
Having been rebuffed by Greyhound and the SEC, Peck and Rustin
decided to turn to the courts. This raised further problems. Most
importantly, they didn’t know any securities lawyers. Here, Peck called on
an unlikely ally, Waties Waring, at that time a federal judge in South
Carolina and a staunch opponent of segregation (driven out of his home

Nicholas, supra note 6, at 183–84 (quoting SEC Minutes, March 7, 1951). Only two Commissioners
were recorded as being present at the meeting where this was discussed.
173. See supra text accompanying note 153.
174. BARNES, supra note 57, at 57.
175. Id.
176. Harry Heller, Stockholder Proposals, 4 VA. L. WKLY. DICTA COMPILATION 72, 74 (1953).
Heller was writing here about both the Greyhound proposal and two other proposals that the SEC
allowed excluded from corporate proxies. See id.
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state, Waring would move to New York in 1952).177 Waring sent Peck to
Nathan Kogan, a New York corporate lawyer active in the liberal
American Jewish Congress (AJC), who provided a legal opinion that Peck
and Rustin’s proposal had been a proper subject for shareholder action and
who recommended seeking an injunction against Greyhound in federal
court.178 In April 1951, Peck, represented by Conrad Lynn, a civil rights
attorney and fellow rider on the Journey of Reconciliation, sued
Greyhound in the Southern District of New York.179 The suit was
bankrolled by CORE; while Peck paid some of Lynn’s initial fees, he was
eventually reimbursed by CORE, which also paid Lynn directly.180
Peck v. Greyhound was argued at the beginning of April 1951.181
Peck was the sole plaintiff, which led some later commentators to miss the
deep involvement of Rustin and CORE in the litigation. (It is not known
why Peck was the only plaintiff.) He sought an injunction prohibiting
Greyhound from issuing its proxy statement without the proposal, arguing
that in excluding the proposal Greyhound was violating the proxy rules by
sending shareholders a misleading proxy statement.182 In front of the court,
Lynn argued that the proposal was appropriate under Rule X-14A-8
because it targeted Greyhound’s segregation policy and not segregation in
general. According to Peck, the judge
questioned our bringing a civil-rights matter under the Securities and
Exchange Act.
Lynn then pointed out that it is a business as well as a civil-rights
matter, since as a result of its jim-crow seating system in the South
Greyhound needlessly spends thousands of dollars to pay damage
suits brought by Negroes illegally segregated on interstate buses.183

Yet his case foundered on an issue of administrative law. Peck was
challenging Greyhound’s decision, but he also had to contend with the
SEC’s letter agreeing with Greyhound, which he had not yet appealed the
to the five-member Commission. As the Court put it, “plaintiff has not
pursued before it the available administrative remedies to obtain a revision
or review of the interpretation . . . .”184 Without a record created by an
177. Memorandum from the Cong. of Racial Equal. on Greyhound Situation (Apr. 3, 1951),
CORE Papers. Waties was an extraordinary figure. See generally TINSLEY YARBROUGH, A PASSION
FOR JUSTICE: J. WATIES WARING AND CIVIL RIGHTS (2001).
178. Memorandum from the Cong. of Racial Equal. on Greyhound Situation, supra note 177.
179. Peck v. Greyhound Corp., 97 F. Supp. 679, 680 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
180. Letter from George M. Houser to Jim Peck (Apr. 17, 1952), CORE Papers.
181. Peck, 97 F. Supp. at 679–80.
182. Id.
183. Peck, supra note 4, at 377.
184. Peck, 97 F. Supp. at 681.
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appeal to the Commission, the court refused to grant the preliminary
injunction, “unaided as it is by the vast experience of daily contact with
the practical workings of this rule (which the Commission has
had) . . . .”185
Peck and Rustin skipped the Greyhound annual meeting that year but
geared up to challenge Greyhound once more in the fall.186 First, Peck
appealed Heller’s letter to the full Securities and Exchange Commission.
At the end of 1951, Lynn sought a meeting with the Commission to make
a direct appeal but was rebuffed.187 In February 1952, the Commission
wrote CORE and informed it the application for review was denied.188 An
appeal was probably doomed in any case. Before Heller had sent his letter
to Greyhound in March 1951 supporting the company’s decision, it was
discussed at a meeting of the Commission. The SEC Minutes for that
month specifically, and incorrectly, identify Peck as “founder and moving
spirit behind the Congress of Racial Equality.”189 The SEC had already
pigeonholed Peck as a social activist.
With the decision by the Commission in hand, CORE then prepared
an appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.190 This was
not an appeal of the district court’s decision in Peck v. Greyhound, but of
the SEC’s refusal to provide Peck an in-person hearing. In Peck v. SEC,
Peck argued that the refusal violated the agency’s own rules of practice,
which provided that “upon written request for any party a matter to be
decided by the Commission will be set down for oral argument before the
Commission unless exceptional circumstances make oral argument
impracticable or inadvisable.”191 This somewhat roundabout approach was
dictated by the then-state of administrative law and shadowed by
uncertainty over whether courts even had the ability to hear appeals of the
SEC’s decisions concerning shareholder proposals.192 Peck’s brief also
185. Id.
186. At least no record of a protests exists, even in the African American newspapers that usually
covered them.
187. See Nicholas, supra note 6, at 183–85.
188. Id. at 184 (citing SEC Minutes for January 5 and January 15, 1952); Draft Brief for
Petitioners, Peck v. SEC, Civil No. 22,289 (2d Cir. April 2, 1952), CORE Papers [hereinafter Draft
Appeal].
189. Nicholas, supra note 6, at 183–84 (quoting SEC Minutes, March 7, 1951). Only two
Commissioners were recorded as being present at the meeting where this was discussed.
190. See Draft Appeal, supra note 188.
191. Id. at 4.
192. See generally Med. Comm. for Hum. Rts v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1970), 404 US
403 (1972) (vacated as moot). On this case, see generally Haan, supra note 10. CORE’s draft brief
also, however, cited recent court developments supporting its claims, notably Whiteside v. Southern
Bus Lines, where the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a carrier’s rules requiring segregated
seating also violated the dormant commerce clause. Whiteside v. S. Bus Lines, Inc., 177 F.2d 949, 950
(6th Cir. 1949); see also BARNES, supra note 57, at 64–65.
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pressed the argument that the proposal was a proper subject for a
shareholder vote and was not solely of a “political, social, or economic
nature”:
The Greyhound Corporation has sole discretion on the subject of
segregating its passengers on the basis of color. So far that discretion
has been exercised to compel segregation. To change its rule the
corporation does not have to appeal to any outside legislature, it does
not have to run counter to any existing law. Indeed, the petitioner
believes that a discussion of his question in the stockholders annual
meeting may persuade the Directors of the Corporation to change the
corporate practice to bring it in accord with existing law. His question
is not general, it pertains to the specific practice of segregated seating
on the company’s buses. It partakes of a social, economic and
political nature only insofar as any change of policy by a great
common carrier affects these spheres.193

Peck lost the appeal. In a brief per curiam opinion, the appellate court
dismissed his petition for “lack of jurisdiction,” apparently reasoning that
the letter was not an “order” and so the SEC’s action concerning it was not
appealable to the courts under the relevant statutes.194 If Peck wished to
challenge Greyhound’s decision, the agency later stated, he could return
to court and file another suit against the company.195 He never did so,
because before he had the chance the SEC changed the rule.
C. Writing Race into the Securities Laws
At the end of January 1952, before Peck v. SEC was even heard by
the Second Circuit, the SEC issued a release proposing a number of
changes to the proxy solicitation rules.196 Buried in the release was a
change that would cut off not only the Greyhound campaign but all future
attempts to use the shareholder proposal rule to forward African American
civil rights.197 As shown above, since 1945 the SEC had allowed proposals
to be excluded if they promoted general “social, economic, or political
causes.”198 The 1952 amendments proposed to change that language and
allow corporations to exclude shareholder proposals “promoting general
193. Draft Appeal, supra note 188, at 7.
194. Peck v. SEC, Civil No. 22,289 (2d Cir. April 2, 1952); see also 18 SEC ANN. REP. 75–76
(1952) (discussing the case and claiming it held that the letter was neither an “order” subject to judicial
review under the Exchange Act nor an “administrative action” subject to review under the
Administrative Procedures Act).
195. Id. at 76.
196. See Exchange Act Release No. 34-4668 (1952), supra note 9.
197. While “civil rights” has a broader meaning today, at the time at the time it applied to the
movement to end discrimination against African Americans.
198. See supra Section II.A.
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economic, political, racial, religious, social or similar causes.”199 For the
first time, race would become an independent ground for excluding a
proposal, and thus an element in the federal securities laws.
Why the SEC changed the wording is unclear, though given the
timing, it must have been in response to the Greyhound case. It may be
that the SEC feared it could lose the case, were the question of whether
Peck and Rustin’s proposal a proper subject for shareholder action ever
squarely presented to a court.200 As we’ve seen, the SEC apparently
concluded that, because Peck was linked to CORE, his proposal must have
aimed to promote a general “social, economic, or political” cause. But
Peck and Rustin’s proposal addressed a specific policy adopted by
Greyhound: maintenance of segregation on its interstate buses after the
Morgan decision. They also identified specific harms to the corporation:
the settlements paid to African American riders who suffered illegal
discrimination.201 Peck and CORE had lost their two court cases, Peck v.
Greyhound and Peck v. SEC, but both turned largely on the issue of court
review of administrative decisions by the SEC; neither addressed the
question of whether the shareholders’ proposal was actually excludable
under the existing proxy rules. Two 1950s experts on the shareholder
proposal rule, Frank Emerson (a former SEC staffer) and Franklin
Latcham, speculated that a slightly amended proposal would have passed
muster under the pre-1952 rule. “[W]hat if the proposal were limited to the
corporation’s policy of segregated seating on its own interstate buses? It
would not then be ‘general’ in nature. Certainly such a policy
consideration is ‘proper subject for action by security holders.’”202 In other
words, had Peck returned to court and again sued Greyhound following
the SEC’s final refusal to consider his appeal, he may have won. The new
rule assured he would never do so.
Available records make it difficult to discern how the new rule was
formulated or who pushed for it.203 The SEC’s two releases, the January
1952 one proposing the new language and the December 1952 one
adopting it, do little more than recite the amendments and do not provide
the kind of explanation for the changes common in present-day
rulemaking.204 Other changes to the proxy process had already been in the
works, and it may have been convenient to fold the new language banning
199. See Exchange Act Release No. 34-4668 (1952), supra note 9 (emphasis added). It’s not
clear why “religious” was added to the rule, as there appear to have been no shareholder proposals
promoting a “religious” cause made during this period.
200. See Nicholas, supra note 6, at 185 n.72.
201. See supra text accompanying notes 173–75.
202. EMERSON & LATCHAM, supra note 13, at 115.
203. See generally Nicholas, supra note 6, at 192–200
204. See id.; see Exchange Act Release No. 34-4775, 1952 WL 5254 (1952).
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racial and religious proposals into broader reforms. After the first release
was issued there was little lobbying for or against the changes. Most
comments received by the Commission focused on a different part of the
proposal dealing with how corporations should handle unmarked
proxies205 Only ten comment letters were received on the insertion of
“racial” into the grounds for excluding a proposal.206 One law firm, three
corporations, and the American Society of Corporate Secretaries (ASCS)
wrote in to support the change.207 The ASCS’s support mattered; it had
become influential within the SEC over the last few years, and it
represented the corporate officials running the proxy machinery, whose
work would be directly affected by changes in the proxy rules.208
Those writing in to oppose the change, including Lewis Gilbert,
Wilma Soss, the AJP, and the NAACP, recognized how consequential the
addition of the one word would be. They pointed out that the proposed
language, if adopted, would not just ban general proposals touching on
race, it would ban any proposal addressing race, even if it targeted specific
company policies—precisely what Peck and Rustin’s proposal did. Gilbert
urged the SEC not to bar “proposals that may be of general interest to
many of the owners on a matter pertaining to the affairs of the
corporation,”209 while the AJC suggested the proposal be reworded to bar
only proposals on a “general matter[] on which [the] corporation cannot
act.”210 The AJC’s letter echoed Peck and Rustin by pointing out the ways
in which segregationist policies could impact a corporation’s bottom line,
as it frustrated passengers and created litigation.211 To the opponents, it
was clear that the proposal would shut down shareholder discussions about
a corporation’s policies dealing with race. A corporation’s racial policies
might remain in place, but the securities laws would henceforward deny
shareholders any voice about them.
The amendments to proxy rules forbidding proposals of a racial and
religious nature were adopted in December 1952.212 The changes attracted
only minor attention, perhaps because the civil rights movement was still
in its infancy, and journalists and corporate leaders did not foresee that
African Americans’ civil rights would be the defining issue of the next two
decades. CORE did issue a news release which accurately predicted that
the changes would “prevent such cases [as Greyhound] from ever getting
205. See Nicholas, supra note 6, at 183–94.
206. See id.
207. Id. at 193.
208. See id. at 170–71.
209. Id. at 193.
210. Id.
211. See id. at 194
212. Exchange Act Release No. 34-4775, supra note 204.
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started.”213 It pointed out that “[t]hey also make it impossible for minority
stockholders to protest a corporation’s lily-white employment policy or
anti-union labor policy—even though such practices may result in
business reverses at the expense of corporations with fair employment and
labor policies.”214
The consequences of the rule change were minor and immeasurable.
Minor, because all the rule change did was lock in the status quo; apart
from the Greyhound proposal there had been no other shareholder
proposals targeting civil rights, and the rule change ensured this state of
affairs would continue.215 Immeasurable—literally—because we cannot
now tell if anything would have been different were shareholders at other
corporations allowed to file proposals like Peck and Rustin’s. It is possible
that such proposals would have done little; almost all shareholder
proposals offered during this era failed, even those asking for anodyne
corporate governance reforms.216 But such proposals could also have been
a valuable tool for challenging corporate policies that colluded with
segregation, as was the case at Greyhound. Recall the 1951 letter
Greyhound’s corporate secretary Merrill Buffington wrote the SEC
arguing that Peck and Rustin’s proposal should be omitted.217 In it, he
sounded almost panicked at the possibility that the proposal would be sent
to shareholders, the result of which would be to “place Mr. Peck and the
Congress of Racial Equality in a position to charge that Greyhound is
opposed to the abolition of segregation.”218 To Buffington the proposal
was not merely an annoyance but a significant threat to Greyhound’s
business, promising to give real power to activists such as Peck and Rustin.
After the rule change, corporations would be safe from such threats, no
longer in danger of their own shareholders calling them to account for
segregationist policies.
D. Aftermaths
The new proxy solicitation rules effectively ended attempts to use
shareholder proposals to put civil rights on the corporate agenda. Indeed,
the rule was soon read to allow exclusion of other proposals that touched
213. Press Release, Cong. Racial Equal., Race and Labor Issues Outlawed at Stockholders
Meetings (Dec. 29, 1952), CORE Papers.
214. Id.
215. I have found only one reference to an attempt to file a race-related shareholder proposal
before the 1970s. In 1959, a shareholder filed a proposal requesting that CBS allocate more time to
“negro programs and performers,” which it was allowed to exclude from its proxy. Nicholas, supra
note 6, at 239 n.70.
216. See EMERSON & LATCHAM, supra note 13, at 112–13.
217. See supra text accompanying note 165.
218. Peck, supra note 4, at 378.
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on broader social issues even if they lacked a “racial” aspect. In 1953, the
SEC cited the revised rule when it allowed corporations to exclude
proposals asking that a woman be named to a corporate board. These
proposals, made chiefly by Wilma Soss, had been like the Greyhound
proposal crafted to speak not only of societal discrimination but of the
specific benefit a corporation would gain from changing a discriminatory
policy, in this case by electing a female director.219 At American Radiator,
for example, Soss argued for a female director by observing that a large
proportion of the company’s products “go into the home or are used by
women in a competitive market. Company research and development
work should benefit by woman’s angle.”220 Despite this, following the
1952 rule changes the SEC allowed corporations to exclude such proposals
from their proxy statements, apparently adopting an expansive view of
what constituted a “social” issues proposal.221 Additional changes in 1954
further curbed shareholder proposals, allowing them to be excluded from
the corporate proxy statement if they related to a firm’s “ordinary
business” or of they were repeat proposals and had failed to gain a rising
percentage of shareholder votes over time.222
Even after the SEC barred “racial” shareholder proposals, Peck did
not give up on the idea that a shareholder meeting could be a forum for
civil rights protests.223 He and Rustin picketed the Greyhound annual
meeting until 1956, drawing newspaper coverage to Greyhound’s
segregationist policy.224 Also, while the shareholder proposal was no
longer available for racial protest, the SEC’s rule change had not altered
the state corporate law rules which still allowed shareholders to attend
meetings and speak from the floor, and a few took advantage of this. In
1953, two minority shareholders at United Cigar-Whelan stores attended
the annual meeting to ask that the Whalen Soda Fountain in Washington,
D.C., be desegregated.225 In 1954, Peck attended the annual meeting of W.
T. Grant Company, holding a proxy for thirty shares recently left to the
219. It is striking how Soss’s proposals were at the time seen as easily excludable as chiefly
dealing with a “social issue,” whereas contemporary proposals for board diversity recognize what Soss
knew—that claims for diversity can also be demands for improved corporate performance. See, e.g.,
Darren Rosenblum, When Does Sex Diversity on Boards Benefit Firms?, 20 U. PA. BUS. L.J. 429, 430–
31 & passim (2018) (critically reviewing claims that sex diversity produces greater corporate value).
220. EMERSON & LATCHAM, supra note 13, at 105.
221. Nicholas, supra note 6, at 192–93.
222. See Tsuk Mitchell, supra note 6, at 1558.
223. See Haan, supra note 10, at 1215–16.
224. In November 1955, the Interstate Commerce Commission had directly barred bus lines from
adopting segregation policies as a violation of the Interstate Commerce Act. Keys v. Carolina Coach
Co., 64 M.C.C. 769 (ICC 1955). This justified halting picketing of Greyhound, see Picketing Halted
at Greyhound Corp., AFRO-AMERICAN, May 19, 1956, at 13, though the ruling was resisted and
segregation on bus lines persisted. See generally BAY, supra note 5, at 262–67.
225. Greyhound Bus Bias Issue Hit at Meet, PHILA. TRIB., May 23, 1953, at 9.
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War Resisters League, and asked management to desegregate its soda
fountain in Baltimore (reflecting CORE’s approach, while Peck was at the
meeting other CORE members picketed it).226 As he reported, while the
new SEC rule “made it impossible for me to get the question on the printed
agenda . . . I . . . raised it during the part of the meeting allotted to
miscellaneous matters.”227 Shortly afterwards Grant desegregated the
store.228
CORE appears to have abandoned the tactic of protesting at
shareholders meetings after the mid-1950s, but briefly revived it in 1960
and 1961 during the sit-in movement. The civil rights movement had
enjoyed success and public acclaim following the decision in 1954’s
Brown v. Board of Education and the Montgomery Bus Boycott of 1956–
1957, but successes slowed over the next few years. In February 1960 the
movement gained new life when students at North Carolina A&T
University decided to take seats at the all-white Woolworth’s lunch
counter in Greensboro, North Carolina, and refuse to move until they were
served.229 Other students joined them and sit-ins, and arrests following sitins, spread across the South.230 To support the students, Peck and CORE
returned to shareholders’ meetings.231 In spring 1960, Peck bought shares
in several of the chain stores whose Southern branches refused to serve
African Americans. That May, he attended three stockholders’ annual
meetings, protesting segregation policies at S.H. Kress, W.H. Grant, and
Woolworths’, with CORE picketers again outside.232 In a moment that
brought home the events occurring in the South, Woolworths’ annual
shareholders’ meeting was addressed by Barbara Braxton, an African
American university student who had been jailed after attempting to
integrate the Woolworth’s lunch counter in Tallahassee. She had the right
to speak because she held a Woolworth’s proxy obtained for her by
CORE.233 A year later the protests at the shareholders’ meetings were
repeated, albeit without Peck, who was in the South traveling on the
Freedom Rides.234

226. James Peck, Minority Shareholders vs. Jim Crow, CRISIS MAG., Dec. 1954, at 640.
227. See id. at 590.
228. See id.
229. See WILLIAM CHAFE, CIVILITIES AND CIVIL RIGHTS 70–72 (1981).
230. See id.
231. The sit-ins marked a revival of the civil rights movements, and all the established
organizations, including CORE, were “attempting to get in on the sit-in bandwagon.” MEIER &
RUDWICK, supra note 12, at 106.
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Shareholder social activism began to tick upwards in the late 1960s
as a few radicals learned what Peck and CORE already knew: ownership
of shares opened the door to the shareholders meeting. In 1967, the radical
Saul Alinsky purchased shares of Kodak as part of an ongoing campaign
against that corporation to, as he put it, “gain entrance to the annual
stockholders’ meeting for harassment and publicity.”235 But shareholder
proposals were not attempted, as confusing case law and SEC guidance
left it unclear whether a proposal linked to a social issue could ever make
it onto a corporation’s proxy.236
At the end of the 1960s public pressure and then SEC rule changes
reopened the door for shareholders to protest corporate policies via the
corporate proxy. In 1968, the Medical Committee for Human Rights
(MCHR), an organization linked to the civil rights movement, was given
five shares of Dow Chemical.237 It then sent the company a shareholder
proposal for inclusion in its proxy, asking Dow’s Board to “amend its
certificate of incorporation to prohibit Dow from selling napalm ‘to any
buyer unless that buyer gives reasonable assurance that the substance will
not be used on or against human beings.’”238 Dow refused, citing the
provisions of Rule 14a-8 allowing it to omit proposals “primarily for the
purpose of promoting general economic, political, racial, religious, social,
or similar causes,” or that related to a company’s “ordinary business,” and
the SEC agreed.239 MCHR sued. The resulting case, SEC v. Medical
Committee for Human Rights, was inconclusive, but while it was still in
the courts Dow folded and included the shareholders’ proposal in its proxy
statement.240 In the face of Congressional pressure the SEC soon retreated
from its hardline opposition to social proposals, changing Rule 14a-8 in
1972 to make it easier to make such proposals.241 The rule’s blanket
prohibition on “proposals promoting general economic, political, racial,
religious, social, or similar causes” was replaced with a ban on proposals
with “respect to any matter, including a general economic, political,
racial, religious, social, or similar cause, that is not significantly related to
the business of the issuer or is not within the control of the issuer.”242
Following these changes the early 1970s saw a wave of shareholder
235. LAUREN TALNER, THE ORIGINS OF SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM 6 (1983); see also TERRY
ANDERSON, THE NEW AMERICAN REVOLUTION: THE MOVEMENT AND BUSINESS, IN THE SIXTIES:
FROM MEMORY TO HISTORY 138 (David Farber ed., 1994).
236. See generally Note, The SEC and ‘No-Action’ Decisions Under Proxy Rule 14a-8: The
Case for Direct Judicial Review, 84 HARV. L. REV. 835, 844–45 & n.55 (1971).
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proposals relating to social issues. While there were only six in 1972,243
there were well over a hundred by mid-decade.244
Only in 1976 did the SEC scrub race from the securities laws. On
July 7, 1976—three days after the nation’s Bicentennial celebrations—the
Commission proposed to change Rule 14a-8 again by replacing the
language
banning
proposals
concerning
“a
general
economic, political, racial, religious, social or similar cause, that is not
significantly related to the business of the issuer” with a general, colorblind ban allowing corporations to omit proposals that “deal[] with a
matter that is not significantly related to the issuer’s business.”245 The
release adopting the new language insisted it was a matter of form—that
the “substance of the rule has been retained” and that the “illustrative
reference[s] to various general causes have been deleted on the ground
they are superfluous and unnecessary.”246 One doubts that Peck or Rustin
would have agreed.
The Greyhound shareholder proposal campaign would occupy only
a few lines in the history of the civil rights movement, as its proponents
understandably turned their energies elsewhere. FOR would remain
perhaps the most important pacifist organization in postwar America,247
while CORE would become a major civil rights organization in the 1960s.
The histories of these organizations barely mention the Greyhound suit.248
Peck and Rustin would have extraordinary careers and would number in
that small group of men and women who genuinely influenced the nation’s
history. Peck would continue as an activist who was seemingly
everywhere from the 1950s to the 1980, battling racism, militarism, and
toward the end of his career nuclear power.249 He gained greatest fame as
a rider on the Freedom Rides in 1961, which ended with burning buses in
northern Alabama and Peck being beaten by a white mob.250 Rustin would
become a towering figure in the civil rights movement, strategizing behind
243. Susan W. Liebeler, A Proposal to Rescind the Shareholder Proposal Rule, 18 GA. L. REV.
425, 431 (1983).
244. D. A. Jeremy Telman, Is the Quest for Corporate Social Responsibility a Wild Goose
Chase? The Story of Lovenheim v. Iroquois Brands, Ltd., 45 AKRON L. REV. 291, 311 n.154 (2012).
The data as to exactly how many social proposals there were varies; studies found more than 100
social issues proposals in 1976.
245. Exchange Act Release No. 34-12598, 1976 WL 160410 (1976) (Proposed Amendments to
Rule 14a-8).
246. Exchange Act Release No. 34-12999, 1976 WL 160347 (1976) (text of Rule 14a-8 as
amended).
247. See generally KOSEK, supra note 17, at 146–227.
248. See sources cited supra note 12.
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https://www.anb.org/view/10.1093/anb/9780198606697.001.0001/anb-9780198606697-e-1501306.
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the scenes in the Montgomery Bus Boycott, organizing the March on
Washington in 1962, and ending his life as an icon of both African
American and gay rights.251 Neither Peck’s autobiography nor Rustin’s
biography mention Peck v. Greyhound.
CONCLUSION
The history of civil rights and of the nation’s corporation and
securities laws rarely overlap, and the assumption seems to be that the two
areas are far removed. This Article recounts one time where they did
overlap and joins a small body of work aiming to connect race and
corporation law. In 1948, the civil rights pioneers James Peck and Bayard
Rustin each bought a share in Greyhound Bus Lines, then used their rights
as shareholders to try to call that company to task for its policies mandating
segregation on its buses. They first spoke up at Greyhound’s annual
shareholder meeting and then tried to place a shareholder proposal
opposing its policies on the company’s proxy statement, as the existing
securities laws appeared to allow. Greyhound fought back, but Peck and
Rustin only lost when Greyhound was joined in opposition by the
Securities and Exchange Commission. To cut off their campaign against
Greyhound and ensure no future civil rights protest was made using
shareholder power, the SEC changed its rules, holding that “racial” issues
were improper subjects for shareholder action. In effect, the new rule held
that race was out of bounds as a subject for shareholder concern.
Paradoxically, in an attempt to expel racial activism from the corporate
arena, the SEC had written race into the securities laws.

251. See generally D’EMILIO, supra note 23.

